This paper addresses the debate over public participation in criminal justice. On one side of this debate are those who argue that criminal justice policy should be removed from direct political -and hence public -control, and delegated to an insulated panel of experts. On the other are those who argue that the public has to have a decisive role in criminal justice policy, even if we should agree that electoral politics is not a meaningful or constructive form of public participation. One important point at issue between the two sides is whether insulating key policy decisions in criminal justice would be undemocratic, and whether it matters if it is. Answering this question will require us to say something about the nature and value of democracy, and about the kinds of decision-making institutions that democracy requires. To this end, this paper to provide a number of reasons we might have for approving of public participation. Once these reasons are articulated, we can use them to inform the question of how we might reform and rebuild criminal justice institutions to give the public a more productive role. 
Introduction
In this paper I aim to clarify and further the debate over public participation in criminal justice. On one side of this debate are those who argue that the impact of public opinion has distorted criminal justice policy, giving politicians an incentive to introduce harsh policies of dubious effectiveness, and that the solution lies in removing criminal justice policy from direct political -and hence public -control.
On the other are those who argue that the public has to have a decisive role in criminal justice policy, and that the problems arising from 'penal populism' show, not that public participation is bad as such, but simply that the way that electoral politics engages the public in decision-making can be highly problematic. On this latter view, we should agree that electoral politics is not a meaningful or constructive form of public participation, but we have grounds to be skeptical whether 'expert' decisionmaking, uncoupled from public scrutiny and input, will always lead to optimal outcomes; furthermore, it is an evasion of citizens' responsibilities towards the 'dirty business' of criminal justice if we leave experts to make decisions from which we can then avert our gaze. The lesson, according to this latter view, is that we need to think harder about the way the public are empowered to engage in decision-making.
One important point at issue between the two sides is whether insulating key policy decisions in criminal justice would be undemocratic, and whether it matters if it is.
Answering this question will require us to say something about the nature and value of democracy, as well as saying something about the kinds of decision-making institutions that democracy requires. To this end, I aim in this paper to provide a number of reasons we might have for approving of public participation. Once these reasons are articulated, we can use them to inform the question of how we might reform and rebuild criminal justice institutions to give the public a more productive role. My aim in this paper is mainly to give a clear articulation of the ground on which this debate should proceed, and to show how we can begin to assess the strength of these arguments. While a (critical) friend of the pro-public-participation side, 1 I do not regard the argument as being settled, and I aim to show some of the challenges that lie ahead in making the case for this side of the argument.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 I outline the view that we need a mechanism whereby criminal justice policy can be insulated from certain forms of public input. I look at the concern that this move might be undemocratic, as well as some responses to this concern. In section 3, I move to the other side of the debate, looking at the work of Albert Dzur. Dzur argues that the real solution to penal populism is greater public input. In section 4 I try to clarify the grounds of the debate between Dzur and his opponents, and I put forward eight theses that might be advanced by Dzur in defence of his claims; doing so allows us also to see how Dzur's opponents might respond, and therefore how the debate might be pushed forward.
After some evaluative discussion of these claims, section 5 concludes with some further reflections.
Is the weakening of public control over criminal justice policy undemocratic?
Reviewing the twelve 'indices of change' within contemporary (Anglo-American)
criminal justice systems that David Garland lists at the outset of The Culture of Control, the reader cannot help but see an overall picture emerge. According to this picture criminal justice policy has altered over the past thirty or forty years (for the worse?) as a result of the increased assertiveness, or at least the increased influence, of a criminologically-unsophisticated public. 2 'The decline of the rehabilitative ideal,'
'the re-emergence of punitive sanctions and expressive justice,' the changing 'emotional tone' of criminal justice policy and 'politicisation and the new populism:'
the suggestion, at first glance at least, is of untutored retributive public sentiments usurping the role previously occupied by penological experts, emotion replacing reason. Garland expresses this view of the rise of 'penal populism' as follows:
'There is now a distinctly populist current in penal politics that denigrates expert and professional elites and claims the authority of "the people," of common sense, of "getting back to basics." The dominant voice of crime policy is no longer the expert or even the practitioner but that of the longsuffering, ill-served people -especially of "the victim" and the fearful, anxious members of the public. A few decades ago public opinion functioned as an occasional brake on policy initiatives: now it operates as a privileged source. The importance of research and criminological knowledge is downgraded and in its place is a new deference to the voice of "experience,"
of "common sense," of "what everyone knows."'
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Garland is careful to leave it ambiguous whether the group that has usurped the criminal justice agenda is the public itself, or rather some elite group that claims to 5 speak on behalf of the people -perhaps for its own ends. 4 For instance, does the appropriation of the criminal justice system by 'the public' represent genuine popular control, or is the appeal to the 'public' simply a device employed by politicians -and those in whose interests they act -to win votes and further specific political ends?
Are the public really subject to the 'fear of crime' and the retributive passions that appear, on Garland's picture, to be driving the political agenda? 5 We will come back to these questions later.
However we should understand the deeper significance of what is going on, the phenomena that feed this analysis seem to be reasonably clear. Greater use of imprisonment and longer prison sentences; prison conditions that arguably violate human rights; the widespread denial to prisoners of basics of citizenship such as a right to vote; 'three strikes and you're out' policies that have the effect of bringing more people into the criminal justice system as a result of minor criminality; victim impact statements at sentencing; Megan's laws; civic and employment restrictions on those with a criminal record … measures of questionable impact on real public safety are introduced in the apparent hope of satisfying a perceived public appetite, while experts, evidence and experience are neglected or even denigrated and ridiculed. 6 Furthermore, one key driver of this nexus between assertive public punitiveness and political power has been the electoral system. 7 Politicians have found that appealing to simple messages about crime control and individual responsibility -protecting 'us' against 'them' who would threaten us -has led to electoral success, and whatever the complexities that lie behind this fact, it has prevented the development of a serious and evidence-sensitive debate about crime in countries like the U.S. and the U.K..
Those at the sharp end of mass incarceration -often those who are already the most vulnerable in our societies -have been the needless victims of this rise in the temperature of the public mood and its political expression. Committee, into whose hands responsibility for key policy decisions should be placed, rather than having them made by politicians who are more directly accountable to the electorate? 8 The problem that we will be looking at in this paper is that this might look undemocratic. After all, two large, but in principle attractive, principles might suggest that such a move would involve taking decisions away from the public that they have a right to make: first of all, that the rationale of institutions like the criminal justice system is to serve the public, and so the formulation and execution of criminal justice policy has to remain in the end the public's business; and secondly, that the ultimate source of authority in the state is the people as a wholeso no institution can legitimately act in the public's name without the public's say-so.
These two claims seem to speak in favour of ultimate control over public policy resting in the hands of the public. Many would say that democracy has to consist in more than just popular sovereignty, at least if this is construed as the idea that any policy affirmed by a quorate majority vote is legitimate. Democracy is at least in part grounded in a belief in the basic equality of each citizen, and this has led many to think that a political system in which the popular vote is constrained from passing laws that would violate that basic equality (e.g. laws that would deny some citizens a basic standard of treatment, as in an apartheid system), for instance by a constitution containing a bill of fundamental rights, is not undemocratic.
Furthermore, finally, 4) we might argue that there is no incompatibility, in principle, between democracy and the delegation of powers to representative or expert bodies to carry out particular functions -including functions of policy-setting. 9 The MPC would not be illegitimately usurping any functions that should belong to the demos, it might be said, as long as the demos has authorized it to carry out that job. Democratic authorization is a bit like a collective version of consent -a transfer of rights from one party to another, or an endowment of rights on one party by another. Your taking my property without my say-so would be an illegitimate denial of my authority over it, and hence theft; but once authorized by me to take it, you are within your rights to do so. Similarly, it might be said, there is no conflict with the authority of democracy if an expert body is democratically authorized to make those decisions. There is no incompatibility between delegation and democracy. If there were nothing more to democracy than the importance of collective authorization then this would definitively answer the charge that insulating sentencing policy from popular control is undemocratic.
A dissenting voice: in favour of greater public participation
In his book Punishment, Participatory Democracy and the Jury, and a series of articles, Albert Dzur has argued for a different view.
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On Dzur's alternative, it is not public participation in criminal justice as such that is the problem. Rather the problem is a democratic deficit in criminal justice, and it is greater and more meaningful democracy that is required to get us out of it.
'The criminal justice discourse on the penal state views populism in a negative and monochromatic light, overlooking the constructive tendencies of populist movements historically and neglecting the possibility that public involvement could lead to less rather than more punitive policy in contemporary politics.' worries that there is a 'lack of will or political capital to launch such reforms;' indeed, this practical problem is implicit in the diagnosis of the problems to which this response is meant to be a solution, namely, the decline in public deference to expert bodies (p. 31). Secondly, even if such a committee could get off the ground, it would be unlikely to be effective in the long-term because it fails to engage the public and hence engender the support and understanding that are necessary for any public body to command allegiance (p. 30). Thirdly, and fundamentally, policies such as that suggested by Lacey 'imply that the public is unable to self-regulate, unable to own up to a more measured approach to criminal justice, to punish but in a more thoughtful, consistent and humane fashion without strict elite guidance' (p. 31). Dzur acknowledges that Lacey might respond in the way we have considered above: that there is no incompatibility between democracy and insulating protection of fundamental rights, or between democracy and delegation. But he makes three points:
i) that it is not clear that an insulated sentencing committee would be making only technical decisions, and that the political part of their decision-making should in a democracy be the business of the public; ii) that crimes are thought of, in
Blackstone's terms, as 'public wrongs,' and hence as acts the nature of which the public is intimately concerned; and iii) it is to treat the public, from whom we can and should expect more, as legitimately 'careless regarding the lives of others'. 'Mobilization strategies, in the form of signature drives, door-to-door canvassing operations, or protest marches, are potent but toxic. As Boyte points out, "they expect very little of the citizen; they depend upon caricatures of the enemy; and they are forms of citizen participation in which professionals craft both the message and the patterns of involvement."
Organizing strategies, by contrast, stress "patient, sustained work in communities," "face to face horizontal interactions among people," and "respect for the intelligence and talents of ordinary, uncredentialed citizens"' (p. 35).
Unlike mere mobilization, genuine citizen organization gives lay people the opportunity -and indeed requires of them -to engage in making key decisions themselves, bringing their particular skills to bear and hence contributing to a wideranging collective pool of experience and knowledge, engaging in debate and thinking things through together, and thereby making both the resultant policy itself and the public support it can command more robust.
On the basis of this distinction between the potentially toxic 'mobilisation' strategy and the more participatory, deliberative and robust 'organisation' strategy, Dzur's claims about penal populism can therefore be reconstructed as follows. The rampingup of criminal justice policy is the result of a particular form of public engagement characterized by a situation in which policy is formulated by political representatives competing for votes. This situation allows for, and even encourages, a lack of care and responsibility on the part of the public who are voting for one policy or another.
Rather than having the weight of the fate of particular individuals on one's hands, one is rather expected to respond to caricatures and broad claims that it becomes impossible to verify. Politicians are adept at finding a 'message' that will portray the issues in a particular way, and which will maximize the number of votes they can get.
In such a way the public need not be seen as acting stupidly: they may be reacting appropriately given the way the issues are portrayed to them. But that is not the same end as increasing public understanding of complex and many-sided situations and encouraging careful examination of the issues. If the public in these circumstances ends up voting for policies that reflect simple retributivist stereotypes, this is not because the public are incapable, if put into a situation that requires it, of dealing with many-sided complex problems. What we have done so far is to set up a debate about the proper response to those indices of change noted by Garland. Either side of the debate has to hand a diagnosis of the problem that these changes represent and a prescription for how to address it.
According to one side, the problem lies with the extent of involvement of public opinion, opinion which, given social structural realities, is not particularly tractable at present; this diagnosis leads to the prescription that we should insulate criminal justice policy from public involvement. On the other side, by contrast, the problem lies rather in the disconnect between policy makers and the public, where representatives create policies that can gain public assent on the basis of superficial engagement, and the prescription is, rather than creating a formally insulated but actually inherently fragile panel of experts (fragile because it cannot gain popular support), to increase meaningful public participation.
This debate raises a number of questions that are beyond the remit of the paper. For instance, if it were unrealistic to think that there would be either the political or popular will -or structural space -to undertake the kind of participation that Dzur recommends, his view would be more of a long-term aspiration than a live option.
How realistic a proposal it is is not something I will attempt to address here. According to the 'protective' conception, democratic procedures are instrumentally justified as the best available means by which the individual rights can be protected from abuse by government and by other fellow citizens. Democracy may not be intrinsically just, on this conception; 16 rather the justification is that a system that accommodates a degree of popular sovereignty, applied by representatives and constrained by a constitution, is a powerful way to create a social scene marked by the stable protection of rights and freedoms. According to the developmental conception, however, democracy can have something of intrinsic value to it: democracy is necessary, not only, as a contingent matter, for the protection of individual rights, but also, non-contingently and constitutively, for something like 'the education of an entire people to the point where their intellectual, emotional and moral capacities have reached their full potential and they are joined, freely and actively in a genuine community.' 17 The developmental conception need not reject constitutionalism, or representative democracy, or the rule of law, or those other elements that serve to constrain the untrammelled exercise of popular will -or at least, it need not reject them entirely; nevertheless, on the developmental conception, some form of active engagement in the political life of one's community is an aspect of the good human life, and life is to some extent impoverished where this is absent.
It may in the end prove too simple to say that Lacey takes the protectionist view in which the key role of the state lies in the establishment and maintenance of a regime of stable protection of the rights of all those individuals who make up the polity; while the conception defended by Dzur sees citizen involvement in the state as a necessary part of a genuinely human life; but that will be a reasonable starting point for our discussion. Furthermore, should Dzur be able to back this developmental claim up, it will give his position some room for manoeuvre in the following sense.
Even if it were the case that democratic institutions with a high degree of public participation were not the best available means to creating a stable regime where the interests of all can be protected -if, for instance, as Lacey suggests, a better route might be to create an insulated expert committee immune to direct public participation and control -there may be some further values that make these otherwise deficient outcomes in some way worth it. In other words, the fact that certain developmental values are served might make it the case that outcomes that are deficient in certain respects or up to a certain degree can and should be tolerated. Of course, this may not be the case, and it may be that public participation will make the system function more accurately than otherwise. We will consider some arguments for this conclusion below. But even if it were to turn out that this is not the case, it
would not necessarily follow that Dzur's argument was defeated. Politics is always a function of balancing and of gain and loss -the idea of a perfect state in which all values can be reconciled without moral loss is a figment of Isaiah Berlin's imagination (though of course, he took this as a target to argue against rather than to endorse). The main point, though is that we should wait to see what case can be made for those developmental values before we conclude that the only thing that matters is 'what works' in protecting basic rights and interests.
With this by way of preamble, let us turn now to a review of reasons that favour public participation. I will set out eight claims that might be put forward, separately or, more likely, jointly, and which are relevant to Dzur's case in favour of greater public participation. Having presented each, I will consider some complexities and possible responses. This will in no way amount to a comprehensive discussion, let alone the establishing of Dzur's case. This review will rather, I hope, serve the purposes of clarifying the nature of the debate and setting out the ground on which the arguments will have to take place. Nevertheless, it will also help to show, I hope, the argumentative resources that Dzur has on his side.
It might also be useful to say something about the organization of the following theses. A-C can be considered as grounds for thinking that at least some of the things that count in favour of Lacey's model will also count in favour of Dzur's: so the lesson from these theses is that Lacey's model has not been proven to be the better one. Theses D and E then point to problems that might arise from Lacey's model, and hence advantages of Dzur's. Then with F, G and H, we get to the heart of Dzur's case -these are the key questions that will need to be worked through in order to decide how compelling his conclusions are. For instance, if F ('The Correction Thesis') is true, or at least partially true, then all the other theses would become immediately more appealing as a package; if it is not true, we face difficult choices.
A. The Defusion Thesis. 'The most urgent need is to take criminal justice off the agenda of electoral politics. But this could be done equally well by having key decisions made by a jury, or a commission on which there would be significant lay membership, as it would by the institution of a commission of experts.'
The question critics would ask is what is meant by 'could be done equally well.' On the one hand, it means merely that the use of the jury is another option for insulating key decisions from electoral politics. Nevertheless, the conclusion that we should draw from this criticism is not that the Fairness Thesis fails, but that an argument needs to be provided to tell us which types of decisions considerations of fairness apply to and why. The Fairness Thesis does seem to succeed in establishing that fairness as well as accuracy counts in the assessment of at least some decisions, in some contexts.
The overall thrust of A-C, then, is that there are some democratic values that could be compatible with Lacey's proposal of democratic delegation, but that could be served just as well, or even better, by public participatory mechanisms. But can we go further in support of Dzur?
D. The Efficacy Thesis. 'Public support is necessary for the effective functioning of the criminal justice system, and is best brought about by having the public participate within that system.'
This thesis makes two controversial claims that would need further support. First of all, that public support is necessary, and secondly that it is best brought about through public participation. In support of the first, one might point to the fact that officials themselves need to some extent to believe in the values of the system; and public input and cooperation is needed at many stages. In support of the second, one might point to the distance that can open up when the system becomes (or is perceived to have become) autonomous. However, it is also true that modern citizens have become quite used to centralized agencies as well as large private companies taking care of much of the business of everyday life. Of course, there is a large debate about whether such a state of affairs allows 'insulated' institutions to have great power without accountability. But at least sometimes, it might be said, autonomy from public opinion is clearly no bad thing, since it enables public institutions to practice moral leadership -which they have done in the U.K. for instance by prohibiting capital punishment in the face of public opinion. So the argument over the Efficacy Thesis is not settled -though it may be strengthened by combination with some of the further theses below.
E. The Civic Schoolhouse Thesis.
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'Having greater public participation in decisionmaking in institutions like criminal justice helps to increase civic virtue in two important ways. First of all, it confronts citizens with the genuine difficulties and complexities of decision-making, and hence leads to a greater understanding of the challenges faced by representatives and officials, and helps to reduce disillusionment and disconnection between the two. And secondly, it makes citizens more adept at the kinds of skills of civic political thinking that officials need to employ, skills that are essential for the day-to-day business of (self-) government.'
With this thesis we broach one of the sources of the view that political participation is part of the human good -and hence the source of the developmental conception of democracy canvassed earlier. Political participation enriches human life, in part due to the acquisition of new and important skills, and in part by increasing one's awareness of the complexity around one. One of the main charges that could be made against this point is naïve optimism about the transformational potential of political engagement. Are citizens really likely to be shaken out of apathy and mutual suspicion by being given serious responsibility? Or is that simply to hand over the fate of those being decided about to people who simply won't take it seriously?
Evaluation of juries is of course controversial. 21 Two things that might count in favour of the Civic Schoolhouse Thesis, but about which we would need more evidence, are a) whether the imposition of responsibility can, in favourable circumstances, have the effect of encouraging people to deliberate seriously, and b)
whether the fact that jury responsibility is one-off (or at any rate occasional or episodic) prevents it from becoming routine, and hence leaves jurors sensitized to the responsibility they bear. Some evidence about this might come from the literature on restorative justice. 22 However, the last word at present might perhaps be given to Lord
McCluskey:
'Now before this discussion began, if the Lord Chancellor will permit me, he said that many people -members of the public -they want to hang and they want to castrate and cut off the hands of thieves and things like that. My experience is that that may be what the people in the street think about crimes they read about in the papers but once they come into court and sit for several days, or even several weeks, they see the accused person, listen to the evidence, they discover the multi-faceted aspects of the case. Then they emerge as rational, judgemental human beings, and not the people who are screaming for the scaffold.'
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F. The Correction Thesis. 'Contrary to the claim that the public lack expertise, there is a clear role for non-technical evaluative decisions at every stage of the criminal process, and there is no reason to think that the public would be less accurate in making such decisions than public officials. Indeed, a group like a jury may be more likely to be able to come up with accurate decisions for a number of reasons having to do with the biases that can affect those who operate within institutions. These may include: i) the fact that expert discretion and judgement are often exercised individually, whereas the jury would benefit from explicit collective deliberation involving a range of perspectives, and where one person's view can be challenged by others and improved, allowing a decision to be reached in which that range of perspectives are taken into account; ii) the fact that experts may become desensitized to the human reality that they are dealing with, as individuals become 'cases' or 'clients,' assimilated to a short-cut or stereotype that allows for efficient but distorting treatment, whereas a jury of one's peers may be more likely to deal with the case through fresh, untainted eyes; iii) the fact that experts are constrained by institutional procedures that have to meet demands of generality, simplicity, clarity, and may therefore have to artificially leave important elements of the situation out of consideration -e.g. to align the present decision with authoritative decisions in prior cases -whereas a jury could have the freedom and will to ignore such procedural constraints and attend to the essence of the matter in hand.'
This argument says that public input into decision-making can correct for biases that in official-made decisions arising from individual discretion, routine desensitization and procedural distortions. How could this thesis be established? The argument requires a) some criterion of correctness for decision-making; and b) comparative evidence regarding the performance of experts in institutions and the performance of lay people, controlled to ensure that only the relevant variables are being tested. It is probably unlikely that we have such evidence, or could get it. 24 However, the thesis relies on claims about the kinds of distorting forces that are at work on those who fill institutional roles. And it must also rest on a certain assessment -again hard to imagine how we would verify -of the moral competence of the average member of the public. Set against the Correction Thesis, one would have to consider a more positive view of institutions as in principle progressively learning repositories for good practice regarding social needs and challenges. This might in turn require a wider consideration of professions and their role in a democracy. 25 Dzur does not reject this more positive view entirely -his view is that public input needs to take place under the aegis of institutions, and that juries should not be free to disregard institutional constraints altogether. Even if the thrust of the Correction Thesis is accepted, on the question of exactly where to find the just balance between institution and lay input, the devil will be very much in the detail.
G. The 'Rule of Men Not Law' Thesis.
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'This thesis reverses the traditional dictum trumpeting the rule of law. 27 The idea of the rule of law is that the role of individual discretion should be reduced and replaced by the determination of outcomes by general rules that apply to everyone. The 'Rule of Men' thesis holds that if the removal of discretion goes too far then the only rights that can be claimed are those that meet purely institutional criteria of desirability (for instance, that they can be stated in a clear and generalizable rule that is not subject to counter-examples). This can distort the honest and open-minded appreciation of the relevant features of the individual case. The 'Rule of Men' Thesis therefore has an epistemic aspect to it, according to which being free from procedure can make it more likely that an accurate decision will be arrived at. But there is also a normative component, concerning the quality of interaction between the representative of the institution and those with whom they deal. A person who is treated a certain way because the rules so determine may feel that their situation has merely been treated as an instance of a rule, and that their individuality has been undermined. There is some value in a type of authentic human interaction in which the members of a jury are asked to respond directly to the humanity of the other -and asked, not merely to follow the rules, but also whether the rules do justice to the nature of the case. They are therefore asked to take responsibility for an appreciation of the person's situation in such a way as to put them in a more direct -and more valuable -relation to that person than would be possible for an official whose conduct is mediated by rules and routine.'
The 'Rule of Men' thesis is connected with a theme of pro-democracy theorising that
has not been common in recent Anglo-American political theory but which flourished at the time of the New Left: the theme that institutions had become impersonal and bureaucratic, that some of our key relations and decisions are carried out automatically, efficiently, but with a sacrifice of those human characteristics that make them valuable -characteristics to do, not so much with getting the right outcomes as with having the right sorts of interactions. 28 The epistemic aspect of this thesis is connected to E(iii) above and claims that what is wrong with automatic, rulemediated interactions is that they get the wrong answer. But another part of the thesis claims that, even were it to be the case that merely following the rules would be more likely to get you to the right answer, there would still be independent value in the decision being made by authentic human scrutiny. This is one aspect of the developmental democracy thesis -that there are some specifically political decisions the making of which through genuine scrutiny and care and the exercise of epistemic and moral virtues is inherently valuable.
The 'Rule of Men' thesis argues -to some extent at least -against the rule of law.
One advantage of the rule of law is of course that it means that people have rights that can be claimed in a court of law and are not subject to the gift or arbitrary say-so of a party who has power over the individual. This thesis and the last attempt together to get at the point Dzur draws from
Chesterton's response to the jury. For Dzur this is a point about responsibility and the need for non-evasion. The thesis rests on a view of citizenship as a role in a valuable relationship, a role that brings responsibilities the fulfillment of which can be part of a viable conception of the human good. 30 To defend this thesis we would need to explain in what way citizenship is indeed an inherently valuable relationship -for instance, by reference to the particular value and achievement of self-government. We would also need to defend the second part of the thesis, namely, that some responsibilities are such that one cannot pass them on but must carry them out oneself. This has the ring of truth in certain cases -but how far does it generalize?
Does the thesis show that there should be wide public participation in e.g. the health service, or in other essential public services in the way that Dzur argues there should be in criminal justice? Again, however, this thesis is part of a dissatisfaction we can associate with the New Left regarding the moral quality of our interactions in modern society -that we are misled by the attractions of efficiency and convenience and fail to appreciate the way in which a richer conception of relations and responsibilities is leaching away.
Concluding Remarks
We opened this paper with a consideration of the argument over the compatibility with democracy of a concrete policy proposal -the setting up of a sentencing commission staffed by legal and criminological experts. We looked at Lacey's argument that such a proposal would not be problematically in conflict with democratic values. In opposition to Lacey, we saw that Dzur claims, effectively, that such a response would mis-read the problem of penal populism, and that it would fail to solve the problem and may even exacerbate it. For Dzur, we need greater public engagement rather than less. In section 3 of this paper, I have argued that Dzur's argument can be read as having something like the following structure: allowing for greater public engagement is more likely to solve the problems termed 'penal populism' than would Lacey's proposal of the commission of experts; however, even if it does not, it will have independent value. I then listed eight claims that Dzur might make in backing up this argument. I do not claim to have defended Dzur's viewindeed, in some cases I have shown that there are important counter-arguments that would need to be addressed before Dzur's claims could be established. My main concern has been to clarify the ground on which the arguments have to proceed.
I have also sought to articulate two theses -the 'Rule of Men not Law' and 'Special Role Responsibility' Theses -that might be used in defence of some kind of participatory democracy, and which have, I think, been overlooked in the recent revival of interest in Anglo-American democratic theory. These are theses associated with the New Left and its concern that the dominance of instrumental, economic or bureaucratic rationality in contemporary society is leading to the decline of other, richer forms of human interaction. This is a theme that I have not developed in any detail in this paper, but which it seems to me would repay further inquiry. 
